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This paper analyzes an election game where self-interested politicians can exploit the lack of
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is a widely held belief that media play an important role in society by providing information
to the public. However, there is not such great consensus on the question whether media competition
increases accuracy of news. A large number of recent papers present models in which media competition
is desirable. The reasons they point out are various, including the idea that competition in the media
market makes it more diﬃcult for a bad government to silence the media (Besley and Prat (2006)); or
that media competition solves the problem posed by advertisers, who may dislike accurate information
on certain topics (Ellman and Germano (2005)); or that competition in the news market reduces the bias
that media outlets may introduce to make their information conform with readers’ prior beliefs (Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2006)). Some other inﬂuential works, however, question this point. Thus, Baron (2006)
identiﬁes the journalists’ career-concerns as an explanation for media bias that can persist even in case of
media competition; Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) show that media competition does not imply media
diﬀerentiation unless readers’ beliefs diverge; and Panova (2006) argues that competition may segment
the market and create incentives for a media to deviate form truthtelling.
Our paper aims to contribute to this discussion by providing a new ingredient, namely the readers’
purchasing habits, and studying its implications for the accuracy in the market for news. More precisely,
we want to study how the media market structure, and in particular the level of competition in the media
industry and the structure of readers’ demand for news, aﬀects the incentives of politicians to reveal their
information.
To this aim, we set up a model of election campaigns in which self-interested politicians can exploit
the lack of information that voters have about candidates’ preferred policies in order to pursue their
own agendas. As shown by Barro’s (1973) and Ferejohn’s (1986) seminal papers, the establishment
of a control mechanism, such as regular elections, is a way of inducing policy makers to fulﬁll their
campaign promises, and so, to make them choose the policies preferred by the electorate rather than
those preferred by themselves. However, for elections to raise reputation concerns, we need to consider a
model of repeated elections where voters vote retrospectively, as those by Barro and Ferejohn. In contrast,
our paper considers a one shot game, but additionally, it introduces a new player, media outlets, so as to
study whether media can be also a control mechanism to discipline policy makers.
We propose a signalling game with three kinds of players: political parties, newspapers and voters.
There are two political parties: a left-wing party and a right-wing one. From each of the two parties a
candidate emerges, who can be either moderate or extreme. This is private information of the candidate.
The two candidates propose non-binding platforms, choosing either a moderate or an extreme platform.
The aim of candidates is to win the election. Therefore, they may well choose a platform that does not
correspond to their respective type if this were proﬁtable to them. Newspapers observe the candidates’
platforms, update beliefs on the candidates’ type and based on this information decide, simultaneously,
whether to investigate the politicians or not. We model a situation of neutral media that neither lie nor
manipulate the information they get, and that all they want is to maximize their number of readers. We
2assume that voters buy, at most, one newspaper. We further assume that investigating and uncovering
news is audience rewarding, as it increases the probability that a voter buys a newspaper. In particular, we
consider that if a newspaper chooses to investigate and turns out to uncover new information (information
which is diﬀerent from what the candidates declare), any voter will buy that newspaper with a higher
probability than if it does not uncover any news. This links our paper to the literature on competition
and innovation (Aghion et al. (2005)), where innovation, namely acquiring information in our model, is
a way of improving product quality to diﬀerentiate from a competitor.
The aim of voters is to maximize their own utility, but as such utility is not deﬁned on the platforms
proposed by the candidates but rather on the post-election policy, voters want to know the true inten-
tions of politicians (their types). Hence, voters value information and, through their buying behavior,
remunerate the media from uncovering news. Finally, voters take into account the information reported
by the candidates and the newspapers, update their beliefs on the politicians’ types and decide for whom
to vote. The game ﬁnishes when the candidate with the largest support is elected and implements his
preferred policy, i.e., his type.
In this setup, we analyze the incentives of the newspapers to acquire costly information, and how
competition in the media industry aﬀect such incentives. We show that the higher the number of potential
readers and/or the lower the cost or investigating, the more the newspapers investigate. We also show
that the readers’ purchasing habits, i.e., whether they always buy a newspaper with a positive probability
or just in the case some news are uncovered, aﬀect the incentives of the newspapers to investigate.
In particular, we show that if the readers always buy a newspaper with a positive probability, media
competition is good as it induces newspapers to investigate under weaker conditions. In contrast, when
the readers just buy a newspaper in the case some news are uncovered, competition does not aﬀect such
incentives. We then study the game in which candidates and newspapers use pure strategies and show that
only pooling equilibria can exist, i.e., equilibria where the candidates do not make informative speeches.
We also show that the only equilibria in which the newspapers investigate involve mixed strategies. We
therefore analyze the mixed strategies equilibrium and observe that the readers’ purchasing habits will
determine whether media competition favors information disclosure or not. More precisely, we show
that whenever readers always buy one newspaper, the greater the number of newspapers, the more the
candidates tend to separate their type. On the other hand, if readers just buy one newspaper in the case
some news are uncovered, competition is not so desirable. In such a case, a higher number of newspapers
neither makes more likely that an equilibrium in mixed strategies exist, nor it implies more revelation
of information by candidates. We ﬁnally observe that for a large number of newspapers, the readers’
purchasing habits have a negligible eﬀect on the candidates’ incentives to reveal their information.
This paper ﬁts into the new and blooming literature on the role of media in political competition,
which has attracted much attention from economists after the inﬂuential work of Strömberg (2004a,
2004b). Strömberg (2004a) studies the incentives of the media to deliver information to diﬀerent groups
of readers, and shows that because of the increasing returns to scale of the media industry, the media
3provide more news to large groups. In Strömberg (2004b), he tests with data the hypothesis that media
aﬀect public policies, and ﬁnds that the US counties with more radio listeners received more New Deal
relief funds. In a similar vein, Larcinese (2007) shows that information supply is higher in constituencies
with closer electoral races. Other recent papers are Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), who consider a
model in which voters like to see their opinions conﬁrmed and analyze the resulting equilibrium in the
media sector. Chan and Suen (2005) and Andina-Díaz (2006) also consider voters who may prefer like-
minded information, but diﬀerent from Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), they focus on its eﬀects on
political competition rather than on its implications on the market for news. Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2006) are inspired by reputational concerns, and so present a model in which media bias arises as a
consequence of the ﬁrms’ desire to build a reputation for accuracy. Vaidya (2005) and Besley and Prat
(2006) analyze the features of the media market that determine the ability of a government to silence
the media. Closer to our work it is the paper by Panova (2006), who studies how the market structure
aﬀects the media incentives to report truthfully. Although sharing similar concerns, both studies diﬀer in
an important number of aspects. Panova (2006) focuses more on the information structure of the game
and considers a media that can manipulate news. In contrast, the media in our model cannot manipulate
news but rather decide whether to investigate politicians. Additionally, our model deals with media
competition but also with political competition, which is not in hers; and it is richer in the structure of
the readers’ demand for news and in the levels of competition considered in the media market.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model and some basic ideas in Section 2. In Section
3 we analyze the media game, and study the incentives of the newspapers to acquire costly information
and how competition aﬀect such incentives. In Section 4 we deal with the equilibrium analysis. We ﬁrst
analyze the case of candidates and newspapers using pure strategies, and then study the equilibrium in
which candidates and newspapers use mixed strategies. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Two political parties compete for oﬃce. The left-wing party is labelled L,a n dt h er i g h t - w i n gp a r t yR.
Political parties face an electorate of n citizens, where n = nL + nC + nR is a ﬁnite and odd number.
Abusing notation, we denote the group of left-wing agents by nL and that of right-wing agents by nR.
The group of centrist agents is nC.W ea s s u m enL = nR, and so guarantee the median voter is in nC.1
We propose a signaling game where Nature moves ﬁrst and chooses the type of the candidate running
for oﬃce for each party. A candidate can be either moderate, M, or extreme, E, with E ∈ {L, R} for the
left and the right-wing parties respectively. Thus, the set of possible types is TL = {L,M},T R = {R,M}
with tL ∈ TL,t R ∈ TR. A candidate’s type is his own private information, although voters have priors on
it. We denote the probability of candidate in L being L (resp. M) as qL (resp. 1−qL), and the probability
1The groups nL and nR need not to be equal. They can be suﬃciently close, but always assuring that the median voter
is in nC.
4of candidate in R being R (resp. M) as qR (resp. 1−qR). We interpret this as the priors citizens have on
the proportion of extreme and moderate politicians in each party.
The two candidates propose non-binding platforms, choosing either a moderate or an extreme plat-
form, and run for oﬃce. The space of platforms is PL = {l,m}, PR = {r,m} for candidates in party L
and R respectively, with pL ∈ PL, pR ∈ PR. We assume that platforms are non-binding, and so, candidates
implement their types as their policies if elected. A strategy for a candidate from party L is a function
ΥL : TL → ∆({l,m}), and that of a candidate from party R is ΥR : TR → ∆({r,m}). These functions map
the types of a candidate into the choice of a platform (allowing for stochastic decisions). Candidates’
objective is to win the elections.
There is a set S = {1,2,...,s} of newspapers that want to maximize their readership share. Newspapers
observe politicians platforms, update their beliefs on the candidates’ types, and based on this information
decide (simultaneously) whether to investigate the two candidates or not. A strategy for an outlet i is
therefore a function Ψi : PL×PR → ∆({I,NI}) that maps the platforms proposed by the candidates into
the choice of whether to investigate or not (allowing for stochastic decisions).
We model the case of neutral newspapers, i.e., media outlets that do not have a political preference and
therefore neither lie nor manipulate the information they disclose. We assume that when a newspaper does
not investigate, it gets no additional information on the politicians’ true types and therefore reports in
the paper what the candidates have previously told in their campaigns. When a newspaper investigates,
however, we assume it observes the true types of the two candidates and reports this information in
the paper. It does not imply, however, that readers can directly observe whether a newspaper has
investigated, but, in general, readers can only be sure about a newspaper’s investigation in the case it
uncovers new information. We denote by Mi = {lr,lm,mr,mm} the space of messages for an outlet i,
∀i ∈ S = {1,2,...,s}, and by mi ∈ Mi an element of this set.
In the model it is assumed that investigating and uncovering new information is audience rewarding.
In particular, we assume that when newspapers do not report any new information on the candidates,
voters buy one newspaper with probability b ∈ [0,1]; whereas when some do investigate and uncover
new information, voters buy one of those newspapers investigating with probability one. Hence, if no
newspaper investigates, they all divide bn readers evenly; whereas if some do investigate and uncover a
lie, those that investigate divide n readers evenly.2 In this sense, investigating and uncovering news is
audience rewarding.3 Note also that investigating and uncovering news is more proﬁtable, as compared
to not investigating, the lower the value of parameter b. Thus, in the extreme case in which b =0 ,
2Implicit in this assumption it is the idea that voters observe the information published in all the newspapers and that
depending on whether new information is uncovered or not, they buy one newspaper with a diﬀerent probability. To say
it diﬀerently, we model a situation in which voters go everyday to a news stand, have a look at the front pages of all the
newspapers and based on the news reported, buy or not with a diﬀerent probability. This implies that even in the case
the voters do not buy any newspaper, they have accessibility to information, and more importantly, know what is being
published.
3It is important to note that investigating is not rewarded per se, but rather uncovering news on any of the two candidates.
This requires the newspaper to investigate and, furthermore, that at least one of the two politicians cheat in his platform.
5investigating and uncovering news allows a newspaper to increase its sales from zero to 1
s1n, where s1 is
the number of newspapers investigating and uncovering new information; whereas in the case b =1 , sales
can only increase from 1
sn to 1
s1n. Finally, to investigate implies a strictly positive ﬁxed cost, K>0.
Voters observe politicians’ platforms and media’s messages, update beliefs on the types of the candi-
dates, and based on this information cast their vote. Voters’ objective is to maximize (expected) utility,
which is deﬁned on the ex-post policy, i.e., the policy implemented by the elected candidate (his type).
The Bernoulli utilities are: ∀k ∈ nL,u k(L) >u k(M) >u k(R); ∀k ∈ nR,u k(R) >u k(M) >u k(L); and
∀k ∈ nC,u k(M) >u k(L)=uk(R). We assume that agents in nL and nR are captive voters, i.e., they
always vote for the candidates L and R respectively.4 Hence, the game focuses on the centrist voters. A




i=1 Mi → ∆({L,R}) that maps the platforms
received from both candidates and the messages received from the s newspapers, into the choice of whom
to vote for (allowing for stochastic decisions). A centrist voter prefers L instead of R if she believes L to
be more likely a moderate type than R. In case of indiﬀerence, a coin ﬂip determines her vote.5 However,
i nt h ec a s eo fi n d i ﬀerence, if (just) one of the two candidates has been shown to be a liar, we consider a
tie breaking rule that penalizes the cheating candidate.6
The notion of equilibrium we use is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, which, for this game, is a vector
of strategies for candidates, newspapers and centrist voters, ({Υ∗
j}j∈{L,R},{Ψ∗
i}i∈S,Γ∗
C), and a vector of




(i) Candidates maximize the number of votes, newspapers maximize the number of readers and centrist
voters maximize their utility.








j(t0)(pj)P(t0) ∀t ∈ Tj, whenever possible.
(iii) The belief of a centrist voter on a candidate j ∈ {L,R} is derived from Bayes’ Rule, i.e.,







j(t0)(pj)P(t0) ∀t ∈ Tj, whenever possible,
where ξj ({mi}i∈S | pL,pR;t) is the probability that the media send the messages {mi}i∈S, when the
candidates have proposed the platforms pL,pR, being t ∈ Tj t h et y p eo fc a n d i d a t ej.
4This is an assumption only in the case of voters facing two candidates which are assigned a probability of being moderates
equal to one. In any other case, voters in nL (resp. nR) always prefer candidate L to R (resp. R to L).
5If centrist voters’ expected utility is the same by voting for any of the two candidates and either the two have cheated
or none have done it, centrists vote for each candidate with a probability of one-half.




C(mr,{lr}i)=R;w h e r e
Γ∗
C(lm,{lr}i)=L means that the centrists vote for candidate L when the platform proﬁle they observe from candidates is
(lm), and the message proﬁle they observed from at least one newspaper is (lr). We denote this assumption by LP.
63T h e m e d i a g a m e
We start by analyzing the incentives of newspapers to acquire costly information, and the eﬀect of
competition on such incentives.
To this aim, let us denote by θ the generic probability that the newspapers assign to both candidates
being truthful in a particular equilibrium. Note that θ might be diﬀerent in every subgame. Thus, the
probability θ is µ∗
L(L | l)µ∗
R(R | r),µ ∗
L(L | l)µ∗
R(M | m),µ ∗
L(M | m)µ∗
R(R | r) or µ∗
L(M | m)µ∗
R(M | m),
when the platform proﬁle the newspapers observe is either (l,r), (l,m), (m,r) or (m,m), respectively.





R(M)=m, and denote by xR ∈ [0,1] (resp. xL) the belief that
the newspapers assign to candidate R (resp. L) R being (resp. L) oﬀ the equilibrium path. In this case,
there are four possible situations: (i) The newspapers observe the equilibrium platform proﬁle (l,m).
Here, θ = qL(1−qR). (ii) The candidate R deviates. Then, the platform proﬁle the media outlets observe
is (l,r), and therefore θ = qLxR. (iii) The candidate L deviates. The platform proﬁle the newspapers
observe is (m,m), and then θ =( 1− xL)(1 − qR). (iv) Both candidates deviate, and the platform proﬁle
the newspapers observe is (m,r). Therefore θ =( 1− xL)xR.
We now analyze the incentives of newspapers to investigate, and how competition among newspapers
aﬀect such incentives. This analysis will allow us to determine the number of newspapers investigating
in equilibrium as a function of the number of media outlets competing in the economy.
¥ The Monopoly Case
Let us ﬁrst consider the case of just one newspaper. In such a case, the (expected) payoﬀ of the media
outlet if it chooses to investigate is θnb+(1−θ)n−K, as with probability θ the candidates are truthful, in
which case voters buy the newspaper with probability b, whereas with probability (1−θ) the newspaper
uncovers a lie and all the voters buy the newspaper. On the other hand, the payoﬀ of the newspaper if
it chooses not to investigate is nb, as it cannot uncover any news. Hence, in equilibrium the monopoly is
going to investigate whenever K<(1 − θ)n(1 − b).
This condition tells us that in a particular equilibrium, and for a given platform proﬁle, it is more
likely that a monopoly investigates the larger is the number of potential readers (n), the lower is the cost
of investigating (K), or the lower is the probability that a voter buys a newspaper in the case of no news
(b). We further observe that in the case b =1 , i.e., voters always buy a newspaper with probability one,
newspaper’s sales are constant. In such a case, the monopoly never chooses to investigate.
¥ The Oligopoly Case
We now focus on situations in which the media industry is composed of two or more newspapers,
w h i c hi so f t e nt h ec a s ei nd e m o c r a t i ca n dd e v e l o p e dc o u n t r i e s .
Let us denote by s1 the number of newspapers that choose to investigate, and by s2 the number of
them that choose not to do so, with s1 + s2 = s ≥ 2. Let us consider a particular platform proﬁle that
the newspapers observe from the politicians. This platform proﬁle determines a particular value of θ.
7The next result fully characterizes the equilibrium of the media game for each platform proﬁle, i.e., for
each θ. This result allows us to identify the number of newspapers that investigate in equilibrium for any
number of media outlets s, depending on the value
(1−θ)
K n, i.e., on the proﬁtability of investigating.7
Proposition 1 In the oligopoly case of the media game and for each platform proﬁle:
If
(1−θ)
K n<1, then s1 =0∀b ∈ [0,1].
If
(1−θ)
K n =1 , then s1 =0if b ∈ (0,1], and s1 ∈ {0,1} if b =0 .
If 1 <
(1−θ)
K n<2, then s1 =0if 1 <
(1−θ)
K n ≤ s






K n =2and s =2 , then s1 ∈ {0,1,2} if b =1 , and s1 ∈ {1,2} if b ∈ [0,1).
If
(1−θ)
K n =2and s>2, then s1 ∈ {1,2} ∀b ∈ [0,1].
If
(1−θ)
K n ∈ (2,s]\{3,4,...,s}, then s1 = b
(1−θ)
K nc ∀b ∈ [0,1].
If
(1−θ)










K n>s ,then s1 = s ∀b ∈ [0,1].
The proof is in the Appendix.
Recall that θ varies with the platform proﬁle. Therefore, the conditions in Proposition 1 must apply
correctly in every subgame.
There are three important ideas underlying this result, which we present in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 In the oligopoly case of the media game and for each platform proﬁle:
(i) If K>(1 − θ)n(s−b
s ), the unique Nash equilibrium is in dominant strategies. In this equilibrium
none of the s newspapers investigate.
(ii) If K<(1 − θ)n1
s, the unique Nash equilibrium is in dominant strategies. In this equilibrium all
of the s newspapers investigate.
(iii) If (1 − θ)n1
s <K<(1 − θ)n(s−b
s ), there is an equilibrium in pure strategies. In this equilibrium
the number of newspapers investigating is: s1 =1if (1 − θ)n1
2 <K<(1 − θ)n(s−b
s ); s1 = i − 1
if (1 − θ)n1
i <K<(1 − θ)n 1
i−1, for i ∈ {3,4,...,s}; and s1 = {i,i − 1} if K =( 1 − θ)n1
i, for
i ∈ {2,3,...,s − 1}.
The proof is in the Appendix.
It is interesting to note that the equilibria of the ﬁrst two cases are in dominant strategies. This
implies that, for a given platform proﬁle, whenever the cost of investigating is either too high or too low,
any newspaper has a strategy that pays it more, independently on what the other outlets do. Hence,
in such cases, there is no room for an equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which the newspapers choose
both to investigate and not to investigate with positive probability. As we shall see later on the paper,
this result will turn out to be important for our conclusions. For intermediate values of K, however,
the equilibrium is no longer in dominant strategies. There is therefore room for an equilibrium in mixed
strategies. The reader can also note that in the duopoly case, i.e., s =2 ,i fv o t e r sa l w a y sb u yan e w s p a p e r ,
7This ratio is a measure of how proﬁtable is to investigate when no newspaper is currently investigating.
8i.e., b =1 ,o n l yp o i n t s(i) and (ii) of the corollary above are possible. The equilibrium is therefore in
dominant strategies.
¥ Competition and the incentives to investigate
We now analyze how competition in the media industry shapes the incentives of the newspapers to
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i nvesti gat e and som e do not (0<s1 <s).
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To interpret the graph, let us a ﬁrst consider a particular platform proﬁle that newspapers observe
from politicians. This platform proﬁle determines a particular value of θ. Ceteris paribus θ, we observe
that an increase in s, whenever b 6=0 , increases the range of values of K for which at least one newspaper
investigates in equilibrium. This is an important result, because as we will see later on, the fact that a
solely newspaper investigates is enough to "discipline" politicians’ behavior. We also note that ceteris
paribus θ,a ni n c r e a s ei nn increases the incentives of the newspapers to investigate. Finally, we observe
that parameter b plays an important role in determining how competition shapes newspapers’ incentives





s. Competition in the media industry is therefore desirable in such cases, as it makes more likely that at





(1 − θ)n, which does not depend on s, and which further coincides with the threshold in the monopoly
case. Thus concluding that if b =0 , competition does not aﬀect the condition for having (at least) one




is (1 − θ)n, i.e., the value of the threshold when b =0 . Ceteris paribus θ, it is therefore more likely that
at least one newspaper investigates in equilibrium when b =0than when b ∈ (0,1].
We summarize these ideas in the next corollary.
Corollary 2 Ceteris paribus θ, the range of parameter values of K for which at least one newspaper
investigates in the equilibrium of the media game decreases in the probability that the readers buy one
8That is to say, to investigate can now be proﬁtable for values of K for which it was not before.
9newspaper in the case no news are provided (b), increases in the number of potential readers (n), and for
any b ∈ (0,1], it also increases in the number of newspapers in the economy (s).
We can therefore state that whenever b ∈ (0,1], competition in the media industry is desirable as it
makes more likely that at least one newspaper investigates in equilibrium. This is an important result,
because as we will see next, the existence of at least one newspaper investigating, for every platform
proﬁle, is enough to rule out the use of pooling strategies by candidates.
4 Equilibrium analysis
Once we have analyzed the equilibrium in the media game and have identiﬁed the forces that drives
newspapers to undertake investigation, we go into the analysis of the equilibrium of the entire game.
By so doing, we want to study how politicians react to the existence of a media industry that may ﬁnd
proﬁtable to investigate the candidates.
The equilibrium analysis that follows is divided into two subsections. In the ﬁrst subsection, we study
the equilibrium in the game in which both candidates and newspapers use pure strategies. We here show
that there is no truthful separating equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium in which candidates self reveal their
type. Moreover, we show that only pooling equilibria can exist, i.e., equilibria in which diﬀerent types
propose the same platform. However, for these equilibria to hold we need that newspapers do not always
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to investigate. This implies that no equilibrium in pure strategies exists if there is
investigation for every platform proﬁle. We therefore analyze, in the second subsection, the equilibrium
of the game in which candidates and newspapers use mixed strategies.
Prior to the analysis of the equilibrium in pure strategies, and in order to study how media shape
the behavior of politicians, it is interesting to know how candidates would behave in the absence of
newspapers. In such a case, the only equilibria that exist involve candidates using pooling strategies.9
In these equilibria, the two candidates in each party propose the same platform independently on their
types. There is therefore no possibility of having an equilibrium in which candidates make informative
speeches, i.e., candidates reveal their types. The reason why such an equilibrium cannot exist is because
the extreme type in each party will always ﬁnd it proﬁtable to mimic the behavior of the moderate type.
Thus assuring the inexistence of separating equilibrium.
We now analyze the game with newspapers to see whether the existence of such an industry makes a
diﬀerence for politicians.
9To analyze the mixed strategies equilibrium, and show that there is no equilibrium in such a case, we make two
assumptions. First one, that the probability that a moderate type proposes a moderate platform is always one. Second,
that the probability of each candidate being extreme is the same in the two parties, i.e., qL = qR = q. These two assumptions
are the ones we make later on the paper, when we analyze the mixed strategies equilibrium in the case with newspapers.
104.1 Equilibrium in pure strategies
We here focus on the case of candidates and newspapers using pure strategies. The ﬁr s tr e s u l tw eo b t a i n
from the analysis of this game is that even in the case with newspapers, no truthful separating equilibrium
exists. The reason now is that if candidates use a separating strategy and self reveal their type, then
there is no role for the media.10 But if the media do not investigate, then extreme types do better by
pooling than by separating. Hence the impossibility result.
The equilibrium strategy for candidates must therefore imply no revelation of information. In fact,
our next result says that in pure strategies, only pooling equilibria can exist. But there is one major
diﬀerence with respect to the pooling equilibria in the case without media. The diﬀerence is that for
these equilibria to hold, we now need that for some platform proﬁle, no newspaper ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to investigate.11 For if it were not the case, i.e., candidates are investigated for every platform proﬁle,
politicians would do better by self revealing their type. But in such a case no investigation would be done,
as the use of separating strategies by the candidates makes investigation unproﬁtable. To summarize then,
for an equilibrium in pure strategies to exists, we need that newspapers do not always ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to investigate.
Next proposition formalizes these ideas.
Proposition 2 Let us consider that candidates and newspapers use pure strategies. In such a case:
(i) There is no equilibrium in which at least one newspaper investigates for every platform proﬁle.
(ii) There is no equilibrium in which at least one candidate separates and the newspapers never in-
vestigate.
(iii) There are equilibria in which the candidates pool, the newspapers never investigate, and the voters’
beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path are:
(a) xL >q R if qL >q R,
(b) xR >q L if qR >q L,
(c)m i n {xL,x R} ≥ q, if qL = qR = q,
where xL ∈ [0,1] (resp. xR) is the belief that the voters assign to candidate L (resp. R) L being (resp. R)
oﬀ the equilibrium path, when the newspapers do not investigate.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 refers to the cases in which the newspapers either always investigate or never do so.
There are, however, other possibilities. For instance, the newspapers could ﬁnd it proﬁtable to investigate
in equilibrium but not oﬀ the equilibrium path, or the other way round.12 To this respect, we should
point out that only pooling equilibria exist, i.e., there are neither separating nor semi-pooling equilibria,13
10In such a case, no news can be uncovered (note that θ =1always), therefore investigating is not audience rewarding.
11The platform proﬁle can be observed either in equilibrium or oﬀ the equilibrium path.
12This depends on the values of K,n, s,b, a n do nt h eb e l i e f sθ, in each corresponding subgame.
13By semi-pooling equilibria we mean equilibria in which the candidates in one party pool, whereas those in the other
separate their type.
11although we do not go into further details.
One clear implication is derived from our analysis: no truthful separating equilibrium exists in this
model. Moreover, only pooling equilibria can exist, i.e., equilibria in which no information at all is
revealed. But for these equilibria to hold we need that the parameters (K,n,s, and b) and the beliefs of
the media (that determine θ) are such that the newspapers do not always ﬁnd it proﬁtable to investigate.
Otherwise, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
However, from the previous section, in which we have studied the media game, we know that for a
given platform proﬁle, i.e., for a given θ, the higher is the number of newspapers (whenever b 6=0 ), the
more likely to ﬁnd an equilibrium in the media game in which at least one outlet investigates. In such a
case, and if this occurs for every platform proﬁle, no pooling equilibria exist. Even more, no equilibrium
in pure strategies exists. Hence, we next analyze the case of mixed strategies equilibrium.
4.2 Equilibrium in mixed strategies
We consider candidates and newspapers that make stochastic decisions. The reason we do so is because for
any given platform proﬁle, and considering b 6=0 , an increase in the number of newspapers increases the
likelihood of an equilibrium in which at least one outlet investigates. But if this occurs for every platform
proﬁle, then no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. We therefore allow candidates and newspapers to
use mixed strategies, and study the features of the equilibrium that arise in such a case.
We assume qL = qR = q, and focus on the symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium. For the sake
of simplicity, we just analyze those equilibria in which the moderate types do never propose extreme
platforms. Hence, we just have to deﬁne the probability of the extreme types proposing an extreme
platform, p; and the probability of the extreme types proposing a moderate platform, 1− p.
Recall that the newspapers decide whether to investigate the politicians only after they have observed
the platforms proposed by the candidates. This means that the probability of the media investigating
varies, depending on the platform proﬁle observed in equilibrium. Thus, we have to deﬁne three prob-
abilities, which correspond to the three diﬀerent situations the newspapers can face. Let us denote the
probability that a newspaper investigates when it observes the proﬁle (l,r) by z1.L e t z2 be the prob-
ability that a newspaper investigates when the proﬁle observed is either (l,m) or (m,r). Finally, let z3
be the probability that a newspaper investigates when it observes the proﬁle (m,m).T h u s , (1 − zi)s
with i ∈ {1,2,3}, is the probability that no newspaper investigates in situation i,a n d1 − (1 − zi)s is
the probability that at least one does. We now outline the conditions that deﬁne the symmetric mixed
strategies equilibrium.
Proposition 3 In the symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium:
(a) Moderate types propose moderate platforms with a probability of one.
(b) Newspapers investigate with a probability of zero when the platform proﬁle observed is (l,r).
(c) Extreme types propose extreme platforms with a probability of p, the newspapers investigate with a
probability of z2 when the platform proﬁle observed is either (l,m) or (m,r), a n dw i t hap r o b a b i l i t yo fz3
12when the proﬁle observed is (m,m). The probabilities p,z2 and z3 are implicitly deﬁned by the next three
equations:
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The proof is in the Appendix.
The aim of analyzing the mixed strategies equilibrium is to study whether politicians reveal more or
less information as competition in the media industry becomes ﬁercer. However, the reader may note that
this is not an easy task in this case. Hence, as we cannot procure generic expressions for the probabilities
p,z2 and z3, and therefore cannot do a comparative static analysis, we provide some numerical simulations
that give an intuition on the way the mixed strategies equilibrium goes. The data from the simulations
is provided in Table 1 in the Appendix. This table presents the equilibrium values for the probabilities
p,z2 and z3, for diﬀerent values of the parameters K,n,nC and q,a n df o rs ∈ {3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,15}.
The results for the case of two newspapers are omitted, as in most of the examples considered there is no
equilibrium in mixed strategies for such a case. The reason is that when s =2 , the range of the parameters
for which an equilibrium in mixed strategies can exist is so small that, for most of the numerical examples
we consider, we fall in the interval in which the newspapers have a dominant strategy, therefore do not
ﬁnd proﬁtable to mix.14
Analyzing the data in Table 1 we observe that an increase in the cost of investigating, K, implies an
increase in the probability that the extreme candidates propose the moderate platform, 1 − p;w h e r e a s
a rise in the number of potential readers, n, increases the probability of the extreme candidates sending
the extreme proposal, p. We are, however, specially interested in studying how the probability of sending
an extreme platform, p, changes as s does. To this respect, in all the examples we have analyzed, the
relationship between p and s follows the same pattern. We next present two graphs which correspond to
two of the representative examples considered in Table 1, where we depict p as a function of s.
14However, in the example 4 (n =1 0 0 ,n c =6 0 ,K=4 0 ,q=0 .8)w i t hs =2 , there is an equilibrium in mixed strategies




























Example 3: n = 100,n c =6 0 ,K=1 5 ,q=0 .8 Example 4: n = 100,n c =6 0 ,K=4 0 ,q=0 .8
There is one major conclusion we can derive from the analysis of the data: the incentives of politicians
to reveal their types crucially depend on the readers’ purchasing habits, i.e., on the value of parameter b.
In particular, we observe that for any number of newspapers, when b =0the extreme candidates reveal
their type with a higher probability than when b =1 . The reason is that the payoﬀ of a newspaper if
it does not investigate is zero when b =0 , whereas it may be positive if b =1 . Thus, for a newspaper
being indiﬀerent between investigating and not, the rents from investigating must be greater in the latter
than in the former case. Therefore requiring that the candidates cheat more when b =1than when
b =0 . However, we observe that for s suﬃciently large, the probability that an extreme type proposes
an extreme platform does not depend so much on the value of parameter b. This means that for a high
enough number of newspapers, the readers’ purchasing habits have a negligible eﬀect on the incentives
of candidates to reveal their types. The reason is that, as s increases, the payoﬀ of a newspaper that
chooses not to investigate approaches zero when b 6=0 , w h e r e a si ti sa l w a y sz e r ow h e nb =0 . Therefore,
for a high number of newspapers, the three functions that deﬁne the equilibrium do no longer depend on
b, neither so the equilibrium values for p,z2 and z3 .
Finally, we observe that an increase in the number of newspapers do not always imply more information
disclosure. More speciﬁcally, we observe that in order to identify whether newspaper competition is
good or bad for information disclosure, we must carefully diﬀerentiate some cases based on the readers’
purchasing habits. Thus, if the readers always buy one newspaper, independently of whether newspapers
uncover new information or not, i.e., if b =1 , then competition is good.15 In contrast, if the readers
do not buy any newspaper unless some news are uncovered, i.e., if b =0 , then competition is not so
desirable.16 To see the intuition, let us ﬁrst note that an increase in the number of newspapers has
always the same eﬀect on the rents derived from investigating, regardless the readers’ purchasing habits,
whereas it aﬀects the rents from not investigating diﬀerently, depending on parameter b.S p e c i ﬁcally, the
rents from investigating always decrease in s. On the other hand, the rents from not investigating also
15As in such a case, the greater the competition among the media, the more the extreme candidates tend to propose an
extreme platform, i.e., the more the candidates tend to separate their types.
16In such a case, more newspapers reduces the incentives of the extreme candidates to propose extreme platforms.
14decrease in s if b =1 , but are independent of s if b =0 . Let us now consider that b =0 . In such a case,
an increase in the number of newspapers aﬀects exclusively the rents derived from investigation, which
are reduced. But in equilibrium this decrease in the proﬁtability of investigating must be compensated
so that newspapers are still indiﬀerent between investigating and not investigating. It translates into the
equilibrium condition for candidates, which now have to reveal less in order to allow the newspapers to
increase their rents from investigating. When b =1 , however, an increase in the number of newspapers
reduces the no-investigation rents by more than it reduces the rents derived from investigating. This
means that an increase in s makes relatively more valuable to investigate than not to investigate. But,
since the equilibrium condition requires the newspapers to be indiﬀerent between both actions, candidates
now have to reveal with a higher probability.
The intuition behind our results on competition and information acquisition is very similar to the
one driving to the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation pointed out by Aghion
et al. (2005). They show that competition may increase the incremental proﬁt from innovating, but it
may also reduce the postinnovation rents. More precisely, they show that when competition is low, an
increase in the number of ﬁrms especially aﬀects preinnovation rents; whereas when competition is high,
it mainly aﬀects postinnovation rents. This explains the inverted-U relationship between competition and
innovation. Our results could be interpreted in similar terms, as in the model we present competition
aﬀects the incentives to acquire information diﬀerently, depending on b, which could be understood
as a measure of the degree of competition in the media industry (namely, a value of b close to zero
would indicate a high degree of competition, and a value of b close to one would indicate a low level of
competition).
To summarize then, a rise in the number of potential readers implies an increase in the probability
that the extreme candidates propose an extreme platform. On the other hand, a rise in the cost of
investigating implies an increase in the probability that the extreme candidates propose the moderate
platform. Additionally, and more importantly, we observe that a higher number of newspapers does not
always imply more information disclosure. To this respect, our numerical simulations suggest that the
readers’ purchasing habits play a crucial role in the model, provided that the number of media outlets is
not very large. However, if the number of outlets is large, we observe that the probability of candidates
revealing their information does neither depend on the readers’ purchasing habits, nor on the number of
newspapers in the economy.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The main contribution of this paper is to study whether media competition favors information disclosure.
To this aim, we have analyzed an election game where candidates have private information on their own
types. Voters want to ﬁnd out the targets of the parties, since they know that, once in oﬃce, politicians
will implement their preferred policies. In such a setup, we have analyzed the incentives of newspapers
15to acquire costly information, and how competition in the media industry aﬀect such incentives. We
show that the larger the number of potential readers, or the lower the cost or investigating, the more the
newspapers investigate. We also show that the readers’ purchasing habits, i.e., whether they always buy
a newspaper or just in the case some news are uncovered, play a crucial role in the model. In particular,
we show that if the readers always buy a newspaper with a positive probability, media competition is
good as it induces newspapers to investigate under weaker conditions. In contrast, when the readers
just buy a newspaper in the case some news are uncovered, competition does not aﬀect such incentives.
We then study the game in which candidates and newspapers use pure strategies and show that only
pooling equilibria can exist, i.e., equilibria in which the candidates do not make informative speeches.
We also show that the only equilibria in which the newspapers investigate involve mixed strategies.
We therefore analyze the mixed strategies equilibrium and observe that the readers’ purchasing habits
determine whether media competition is good or bad for information disclosure. More precisely, we show
that whenever the readers always buy one newspaper, the greater the number of media outlets, the more
the candidates tend to separate their types. On the other hand, if the readers just buy one newspaper
in the case some news are uncovered, competition is not so desirable. In such a case, a higher number
of newspapers neither makes more likely that an equilibrium in mixed strategies exist, nor it implies
more revelation of information by candidates. We ﬁnally observe that for a large number of newspapers,
the readers’ purchasing habits have a negligible eﬀect on the incentives of candidates to reveal their
information.
The results in this model suggest that the study of the incentives of media to acquire costly infor-
m a t i o n ,a sw e l la st h ee ﬀects of competition on such incentives, is crucial to understand the forces that
drives politicians to reveal their private information. There is however much to do on this respect. For
example, it would be interesting to introduce ideological considerations in the media setup, therefore al-
lowing newspapers to manipulate news; or to study whether it is better to have neutral or biased media.
For such setups, the analysis of the eﬀects of competition on media behavior, and therefore on politicians’
behavior, is something still unexplored that we think merits future research.
166A p p e n d i x
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let S1 = {i ∈ S/Ψ∗
i(pL,pR)(I) > 0} and S2 = {i ∈ S/Ψ∗
i(pL,pR)(NI) > 0}.
The payoﬀ of a newspaper i ∈ S2 is nb1
s if s1 =0and θnb1
s if s1 ≥ 1. On the other hand, the payoﬀ
of a newspaper i ∈ S1 is θnb1
s +( 1− θ)n 1
s1 − K.
In equilibrium, neither do the newspapers in S2 want to join S1, nor do those in S1 want to join S2.
That is to say,
θnb1
s ≥ θnb1
s +( 1− θ)n 1
s1+1 − K when 0 <s 2 <s ,
nb1
s ≥ θnb1
s +( 1− θ)n − K when s2 = s,
θnb1
s +( 1− θ)n − K ≥ nb1
s when s1 =1 ,
θnb1
s +( 1− θ)n 1
s1 − K ≥ θnb1
s when s1 > 1.
Rearranging, we have:
(1−θ)
K n − 1 ≤ s1 if s>s 1 ≥ 1;
(1−θ)
K n ≥ s1 if s1 > 1;
(1−θ)
K n ≥ s
s−b if s1 =1 ;and
(1−θ)
K n ≤ s
s−b if s1 =0 , and rewriting, we obtain the conditions in Proposition 1. ¥
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 .
We ﬁrst prove that whenever K>(1 − θ)n(s−b
s ), "not to investigate" is a dominant strategy. This
requires that the payoﬀ of a newspaper that chooses the strategy "not to investigate" is always greater than
its payoﬀ if it chooses "to investigate", independently on what the other media outlets do. Mathematically,
this translates into the next three conditions: nb1
s >θ n b 1
s+(1−θ)n−K and θnb1




s >θ n b 1
s +(1−θ)n1
s −K, which are the conditions for the cases s2 = s−1, 0 <s 1 <s−1 and
s1 = s−1 respectively. Rewriting, we obtain K>max{(1−θ)ns−b
s ,(1−θ)n 1
s1+1,(1−θ)n1






s given that s ≥ 2 and b ∈ [0,1].
We shall now show that whenever K<(1 − θ)n1
s, "to investigate" is a dominant strategy. Using an
analogous argument to the one above, we obtain K<min{(1−θ)n1
s,(1−θ)n 1
s1+1,(1−θ)ns−b






s given that s ≥ 2 and b ∈ [0,1].
To prove point (iii), let us rewrite the inequality (1−θ)n1
s <K<(1−θ)n(s−b




We now apply the conditions in Proposition 1, and observe that there is an equilibrium in pure strategies
in which the number of newspapers investigating depends on the particular value of
(1−θ)




K n<2, i.e., s1 =1if (1 − θ)n1
2 <K<(1 − θ)n(s−b





K n ∈ (2,s]\{3,4,...,s}, i.e., s1 = i − 1 if (1 − θ)n1
i <K<(1 − θ)n 1










K n ∈ {2,3,...,s}, i.e., s1 = {i,i − 1} if K =( 1− θ)n1
i for
i ∈ {2,3,...,s − 1}. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
Before going into the proof, let us comment on the voters’ beliefs we consider for situations oﬀ the
equilibrium path. We will say that voters form beliefs xj ∈ [0,1], with j ∈ {L,R}, whenever no investigation
17is done,17 and will assume that voters trust the media whenever they investigate.18 The reason for this
assumption, which we call TM,is that in our model newspapers do not lie whereas politicians might well
do.




for every platform proﬁle.
Given the strategies of the newspapers, the voters’ beliefs are γ∗
j(E | pj,p k,(m
j
i = e,mk





i )) = 1.19 Note that for some of the cases we use the assumption TM. Given these
beliefs, the extreme candidates always prefer to reveal their types rather than cheat. This is because the




k(E)=e; whereas his payoﬀ,i fh ec h e a t s ,i se i t h e rqk(nj+ 1
2nC)+(1−qk)nj if
Υ∗
k(E)=m, or qknj+(1−qk)nj if Υ∗
k(E)=e. Thus, the extreme candidates prefer to be truthful.20 Using
analogous arguments we prove that the moderate candidates also prefer to reveal. But if the candidates




, which contradicts the
initial assumption. There is therefore no equilibrium in which the candidates use pure strategies and the
newspapers investigate for every platform proﬁle.
(ii) Let us consider a hypothetical equilibrium in which at least one candidate separates and the
newspapers never investigate. Here, voters’ beliefs coincide with those of the newspapers for the messages
that in equilibrium are sent with positive probability. This includes the beliefs on the candidate that
separates. Hence, the extreme candidate who separates has an incentive to deviate and mimic the platform
proposed by the moderate candidate of his party. This is so as the use of his equilibrium platform is a
signal of his type (extreme); likewise, the use of the platform proposed by the moderate type is a signal
of his being a moderate. There is therefore no equilibrium in which at least one candidate separates and
the newspapers do not investigate for every platform proﬁle.





proﬁle. Let us suppose that candidates in L pool at a generic platform b pL, and candidates in R do so
at b pR. Voters’ beliefs coincide with those of the newspapers for the messages b pL, b pR, i.e., those that in
equilibrium are sent with positive probability. For any other message oﬀ the equilibrium path, pL, pR,
voters’ beliefs on candidate j are {γ∗
j(t | pj,p k,(mj = pj,mk)}t∈Tj, w h i c hw ed e n o t ea sxj, for j ∈ {L,R},
for the sake of simplicity. The payoﬀ of candidate j in playing b pj is either nj if qj >q k; nj + 1
2nC if
qL = qR = q; or nj + nC if qj <q k, for j ∈ {L,R}. For an equilibrium to hold, candidates must not gain
from a deviation. This means that voters’ beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path must satisfy: xL >q R if qL >q R;
xR >q L if qR >q L; or min{xL,x R} ≥ q, if qL = qR = q. The reader can easily verify that such restrictions




<K ,and the newspapers are therefore not interested in deviating. Thus,
17Where xL ∈ [0,1] (resp. xR) is the belief voters assign to candidate L (resp. R) L being (resp. R)o ﬀ the equilibrium
path, when no newspaper investigates.
18Speciﬁcally, we just need the voters to trust in the media more than in the candidates.
19Where subindex i refers to any of the newspapers in the case the politicians have told the truth (hence all newspapers
publish the same information, regardless of whether they have investigated or not); and to those newspapers investigating
in the case they uncovered some news.
20We use LP.
18there are equilibria in which the candidates pool and the newspapers do never investigate.21 ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Let us consider a symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium deﬁned by the strategies:
ΥL(L)(l)=p ∈ [0,1] ΥL(M)(m)=1
ΥR(R)(r)=p ∈ [0,1] ΥR(M)(m)=1
Ψi(l,r)(I)=z1 ∈ [0,1] ∀i ∈ S
Ψi(l,m)(I)=Ψi(m,r)(I)=z2 ∈ [0,1] ∀i ∈ S
Ψi(m,m)(I)=z3 ∈ [0,1] ∀i ∈ S.
The newspaper’s beliefs must be consistent in equilibrium. That is to say:
µ∗









Let us denote by θ the probability that both candidates are truthful in equilibrium, and recall that θ
may be diﬀerent in each subgame.





















i(1 − zi)s−j−1 n
j +1
− K
Both expected payoﬀs must be equal in equilibrium. Thus, we obtain three equations that implicitly
deﬁne the probabilities z1,z 2 and z3. With respect to z1, we know that it is zero in equilibrium. This is
so because the moderate candidates do never propose the extreme platforms, and therefore there is no
point for newspapers to investigate when they observe the proﬁle (l,r).W i t hr e s p e c tt oz2 and z3, we


















2(1 − z2)s−j−1 n
j +1


















3(1 − z3)s−j−1 n
j +1

 + K =0 . (2)
21In these equilibria there is always one type for each candidate that is cheating, even though they do not gain any
additional votes from this sort of behavior. Hence, we could argue that such candidates would prefer to deviate from their
cheating behavior and be truthful instead, because their payoﬀs would not change anyway. If this is the case, the only
equilibria that exist are those satisfying qL = qR = q<min{xL,x R}.
19Once the newspapers have reported their messages, the voters update their beliefs. They are:
γ∗
j(E | e,·,(·,·)) = µ∗
j(E | e)=1for j ∈ {L,R}
γ∗
j(M | m,·,(e,·)) = 0 for j ∈ {L,R}
γ∗
j(M | m,m,(m,e)) = 1 for j ∈ {L,R}
γ∗
j(M | m,e,(m,e)) =
qp (1−q)
qp (1−q)+q2 p(1−p)(1−z2)s for j ∈ {L,R}
γ∗
j(M | m,m,(m,m)) =
(1−q)[(1−q)+q(1−p)(1−z3)
s]
(1−q)[(1−q)+q(1−p)(1−z3)s]+q(1−p)[(1−q)(1−z3)s+q(1−p)(1−z3)s] for j ∈ {L,R}.
The extreme candidates take into account the voters’ beliefs and the probability that the newspapers
investigate, which is diﬀerent for each platform proﬁle. They then obtain the probability p, such that their
expected payoﬀ by proposing the extreme platform is the same than their expected payoﬀ by proposing








which implicitly deﬁne, together with (1) and (2), the probabilities p,z2 and z3.
Finally, we check that the moderate candidates do not want to deviate from proposing a mod-
erate platform. This turns out to be true as the payoﬀ of moderate candidate j is qp(nj + nC)+
q(1 − p)[(1 − z3)s(nj + 1
2nC)+( 1− (1 − z3)s)(nj + nC)] + (1 − q)(nj + 1
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